




Berle VII: The Modern Corporation and A Theory of 
Fields 
Charles R. T. O’Kelley∗ 
On May 26-27, 2015, scholars disparately trained in law, anthro-
pology, economics, political science, history and sociology gathered in 
Seattle for the seventh annual Berle Symposium. As with prior symposia, 
a principal aim of Berle VII was to shed light on the nature of the mod-
ern corporation. As with prior symposia, the voices participating repre-
sented numerous disciplines. What sets Berle VII apart from its forerun-
ners, however, was the decision to make social scientists the dominant 
voices, and to select a theory propounded by sociologists—field theory—
as the focal point and backdrop for the symposium. This choice reflected 
a second principal aim of Berle VII—to introduce field theory not only to 
participants at the live event, but through the published version, to the 
large community of legally trained scholars to whom the theory has not 
yet spoken. Our goal with this is to assist these scholars as they continue 
the never ending task of better understanding the nature of both the mod-
ern corporation and the society in which we live and work. 
The decision to focus on field theory as a potential tool for legally-
trained scholars would not have been plausible but for A Theory of 
Fields, a remarkable book combining the insights of two sociologists: 
Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam.1 Field theory is rooted primarily in 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, but draws on and 
shares insights from institutional theory, network analysis, and social 
movement theory.2 This body of work is immense and, for 
nonspecialists, often dense and nearly impenetrable. Moreover, the barri-
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 1. NEIL FLIGSTEIN & DOUG MCADAM, A THEORY OF FIELDS (2012). 
 2. Id. at 23–31. 
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ers to common understanding between scholars in these related fields is 
substantial.3 A Theory of Fields does the hard work of synthesizing this 
prior work while adding to it McAdam and Fligstein’s unique contribu-
tions.4 The result is a powerful account of field theory which, without 
sacrificing scientific rigor, is easily accessible not only to scholars in  
these related fields but to determined readers in other disciplines or the 
well-educated citizen.5 
The standard law and economic account views the corporation as 
simply a legal nexus for a complex array of ex ante contractual bargains 
made by persons who assume various legally defined roles within a 
firm—CEO, director, shareholder, employee. Whether viewing the cor-
poration or the broader economy, this account takes the human actor as 
the only real entity, and the only unit worthy of analysis.6 Further, each 
human actor is assumed to be a wealth maximizer, who pursues her own 
                                                            
 3. The authors observe: 
[F]or most academics, the more meaningful competition occurs within rather than be-
tween disciplines. So sociologists compete with other sociologists, economists compete 
with other economists, and so on. . . . This internal focus means that most academics at-
tend closely to intellectual trends within their chosen discipline but are only dimly aware, 
if not entirely ignorant, of new lines of work in other disciplines. Needless to say, this 
disciplinary myopia represents another significant impediment to the accumulation of 
knowledge in the social sciences. 
. . . As the number of social scientists has exploded over the past fifty years and the num-
ber of discrete subfields within each discipline has mushroomed as well, the work done 
by the modal scholar has grown ever narrower and more specialized. Scholars have an in-
terest in trying to grow their career by shutting what they are doing off from what others 
are doing in order to claim novelty. 
Id. at 209. 
 4. Id. at 200–08. 
 5. In other words, like Adolf Berle with his seminal work, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property, McAdam and Fligstein are also doing the important work of public intellectuals, by 
making their scholarly work accessible not only to influential actors in other academic disciplines, 
but also accessible by nonacademic actors who operate in the world of government and politics. 
 6. The literature is voluminous. The most cited and root article is Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Bainbridge provides a notable summary: 
Most law and economics scholars embrace a model of business organizations known as 
the “nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm.” These so-called “contractarians” model the 
firm not as a single entity, but as an aggregate of various inputs acting together with the 
common goal of producing goods or services. Employees provide labor. Creditors pro-
vide debt capital. Shareholders provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses, and monitor 
the performance of management. Management monitors the performance of employees 
and coordinates the activities of all the firm’s inputs. The firm is simply a legal fiction 
representing the complex set of contractual relationships between these inputs. In other 
words, the firm is not an individual thing, but rather a nexus or web of explicit and im-
plicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs making up 
the firm. 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Pro-
gressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 859 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
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self-interest at all times, with such self-interest in almost all cases capa-
ble of measurement in pecuniary terms.7 
McAdam and Fligstein paint a very different account in their ver-
sion of field theory. To begin with, human actors should not be viewed 
as near solely interested in economic gain. Equally important is the exis-
tential function of the social. Human actors’ lives are equally about 
meaning making—the effort to live a life that justifies, combats, and 
somehow holds at bay the existential dread that life on this earth will end 
for all of us.8 This does not involve a rejection of material ends, but a 
merging of those ends with equally important nonmaterial goals. 
Even as strategic actors are working to advance their interests, they 
are simultaneously exercising the distinctive human capacity for meaning 
making and the construction of collective identities. People do what they 
do both to achieve instrumental advantage and to fashion meaningful 
worlds for themselves and others.9 
Field theory thus accepts the importance of economic considera-
tions as a motivating factor in human action, but give equal importance 
to the complex array of moral, sentimental, aesthetic, religious, commu-
nal and other motivating factors that accompany our constant effort to 
construct a meaningful life. In other words, individuals act not solely or 
primarily for economic gain, but for “a complicated blend of material 
and ‘existential’ considerations.”10 
Importantly, and again unlike the standard law and economic ac-
count, this existential project necessarily involves not only competition, 
but also collaboration and cooperation with others. 
Our daily lives are typically grounded in the unshakable conviction 
that no one’s life is more important than our own and that the world 
is an inherently meaningful place. But one does not will this inner 
view into existence of his or her own accord. It is instead a collabo-
rative product, born of the everyday reciprocal meaning making, 
identity conferring efforts we engage in with those around us. In 
this we engage as existential “coconspirators,” relentlessly—if gen-
erally unconsciously—exchanging affirmations that sustain our 
sense of our own significance and the world’s inherent meaningful-
ness.11 
                                                            
 7. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s 
Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 151 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 8. FLIGSTEIN & MCADAM, supra note 1, at 34–50. 
 9. Id. at 43. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. at 42. 
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Field theory fundamentally and sharply departs from the standard 
law and economics view of economic and social life in the underlying 
assumption as to the stage upon which human actors act. For Chicago 
style theorists, individuals act autonomously as owners of human and 
money capital via exchange either mediated through free markets or 
within firms. Cooperation is contractual and actions are played out per a 
script agreed on ex ante. The playing field is the market, with firms 
viewed as mini-markets in which a subset of contractual exchanges take 
place. Government’s role is simply to support and ensure a fair playing 
field. 
In contrast to this austere view, field theory sees social and eco-
nomic life taking place in both unorganized social spaces and 
well-organized strategic action fields.12 Strategic action fields may be 
legally or informally bounded. Thus, a large corporation is a strategic 
action field, but within it may be embedded numerous smaller strategic 
action fields.13 In turn, each corporation is “embedded in a broader envi-
ronment consisting of proximate or distal fields as well as states, which 
are themselves organized as intricate systems of strategic action fields.”14 
The boundaries and rules governing each strategic action field are con-
stantly shifting and contested, with incumbents defending the status quo 
and challengers seeking changes to their own advantage. New fields 
emerge as human actors see opportunities not present in existing fields. 
Thus, unlike the standard law and economic account, field theory allows 
us to model and understand how change occurs in socially constructed 
action spaces, including how change occurs within firms and industries, 
and how new firms arise.15 
Finally, field theory acknowledges the power differential between 
human actors flowing from the unequal distribution of human and money 
capital, but sees a dimension that the standard law and economic account 
misses. Human actors pursue advantage by utilizing not just property 
advantages, but through exercising social skills. The most effective hu-
man actors “possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading 
people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people 
in the service of broader conceptions of the world and themselves.”16 It is 
this social skill that enables successful entrepreneurs to construct new 
enterprises, drawing to them other human actors and resources that could 
be deployed in safer ventures. It is this social skill that enables the suc-
                                                            
 12. Id. at 5. 
 13. Id. at 58. 
 14. Id. at 3. 
 15. Id. at 83–113. 
 16. Id. at 17. 
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cessful politician or CEO of a multinational corporation to shift the 
boundaries and rules governing existing strategic action fields in which 
they labor. Crucially, as Fligstein and McAdam emphasize, the success-
ful actor never uses social skill in a narrow, self-interested manner, for 
success is not about narrow self-interest. 
[W]e see strategic action as inextricably linked to the distinctive 
human capacity and need to fashion shared meanings and identities 
to ensure a viable existential ground for existence. This is not to say 
that power and preferences do not matter but that our attempts to 
exercise the former and achieve the latter are always bound up with 
larger issues of meaning and identity. What is more, our preferences 
themselves are generally rooted in the central sources of meaning 
and identi[t]y in our lives.17 
A Theory of Fields nourished all of us who participated in Berle 
VII, and it is my fervent wish that Berle VII will serve as beachhead for 
field theory’s invasion of the turf now held by law and economic analy-
sis. To that end, since the investment in buying and reading a book is not 
inconsiderable, readers of this Symposium volume should pay special 
attention to the generous and important contributions made by Fligstein 
and McAdam. While readers of A Theory of Fields will find a fulsome 
account of the existential function of the social, particularly in Chapter 2, 
a revised and updated version of that account is now available in this is-
sue; see Doug McAdam, On the Existential Function of the Social and 
the Limits of Rationalist Accounts of Human Behavior.18 Additionally, 
readers of A Theory of Fields will notice a paucity of examples illustrat-
ing how field theory actually relates to the fields of corporate law and 
corporate governance. For a detailed “roadmap” richly illustrating those 
connections, see Neil Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and its Application 
to Corporate Governance.19 
Berle VII contains a number of other truly remarkable contributions 
giving special voice to corporate governance thought leaders in the social 
sciences. We hope readers of this volume will savor these fresh and in-
sightful perspective as, following in Berle’s footsteps, we continue to 
encourage and nourish the very best interdisciplinary scholarship focus-
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